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In this work we propose the technique for phase-
codedweak coherent states protocols utilizing two
signal states and one decoy state which is found
as linear combination of signal states (Schrödinger
Cat states); the latter allows to overcome the USD
attack. For instance, Schrödinger Cat states can
be considered as even coherent states. Moreover
we consider decoy states implementation based
on squeezed vacuum states which might not dis-
ables USD completely yet produces discrimina-
tion probabilities low enough to distribute keys
in channel with particular losses. Thus we can de-
tect Eve simply bymonitoring the detection rate of
decoy states. It should be noted that this approach
can be scaled to more complex schemes. © 2018
Optical Society of America under the terms of the
OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement
http://dx.doi.org/10.1364/optica.XX.XXXXXX
1. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution is extremely important field of secure
communication and its security is provided by the quantum
laws. For the last decades huge amount of different theoretical
and experimental works have been performed where a lot of
various schemes with weak coherent sources instead of true
single photon sources were suggested due to their utility, for
instance [1, 2]. Some of them use phase coding protocols instead
of the ones based on the polarization, for instance [3–7]. In
fact each phase coded quantum states, although they can be
generated not in a usual way [5, 8], in the set have overlapping
with each other and that gives a crucial opportunity to Eve to
provide unambiguous state discrimination (USD) [9–14].
As far as weak coherent states are overlapped, they can not
be distinguished perfectly, so Eve can discriminate them unam-
biguously only with the arbitrary probability (depending on the
values of overlapping). In this work we consider only USD at-
tack with inconclusive result yet zero error. This means that Eve
has only two possible outcomes for each state: the unambiguous
identification of the particular state and the inconclusive result.
All inconclusive results can be blocked by Eve and she can in-
crease the intensity of sent pulses to maintain the detection rates.
Also she can perform additional bitflips in order to maintain
error rates since amplified signal will produce less errors. The
strategy allows Eve to provide zero-error attack maintaining
both raw key rates and error rates.
Here we would like to consider the protocol which utilizes
only two weak coherent signal states. Alice sends two states
with phase ϕA ∈ {0,pi}; the first state encodes the logical 0 while
the second encodes the logical 1. The set of phases used by Bob
is the same as that of Alice. Decoding is based on the fact that
each time Alice and Bob randomly chose the same phase there
should be detection event and in opposite case there should not
be one (except for the dark counts). In this work we propose the
special decoy state which Alice sends with much more lower
a priori probability than the signal states. Decoy states only
provide possibility to detect the USD attack and are not used to
extract the secret key out of them.
In this paper we propose the solution to overcome USD at-
tack on phase protocols with weak coherent pulses utilizing
particular kind of decoy states - Schrödinger cat states. This
paper organized as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed general
description of Eve’s strategy. In section 3 we describe unambigu-
ous state discrimination measurement and show fundamental
impossibility to discriminate the states for Eve. Section 4 dedi-
cated to symmetrical case which is natural for QKD systems and
proposed Schrödinger cat states as decoy states. Particular case
is considered in Section 5 where we analyze squeezed vacuum
decoy states. In Section 6 we provide our results and conclude
the article.
2. THE ATTACK
We would like to consider the USD attack with respect to the
scheme shown in Fig. 1. Assuming Eve can split channel in two
- the Alice-Bob channel and the Alice-Eve-Bob channel (lossless
one or with lower losses) where she performs the USD measure-
ments. She decides how many states goes in each channel; let us
denote the probability of state going to Eve’s channel to be Pe.
The original Alice-Bob channel is the classical-quantum
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Fig. 1. a) The Alice-Bob channel . b) The Alice-Eve-Bob chan-
nel, where Eve performs USD attack. It may be considered as
two consequent Alice-Eve and Eve-Bob channels. Symbols
"0", "1", "D" denote states responsible for logical 0 and 1 to-
gether with decoy states respectively. Symbol "?" denotes the
inconclusive result. Conditional probabilities between input
and output parameters of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve-Bob
channels can be found in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. Com-
bined channel’s relations can be found as linear combination
of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve-Bob channels’ parameters with
probability 1− Pe and Pe respectively.
Markov cryptographic symmetric binary error and erasure chan-
nel (BSEE) with probabilities of the inconclusive result G and the
bitflip E (and the conclusive result denoted as C = 1− G− E)
respectively for signal states. However we also include arbi-
trary decoy state which has some probabilities D(0) and D(1)
to be interpreted as logical 0 and 1 respectively. For simplic-
ity one may denote the probability of decoy state detection as
D = D(0) + D(1) however in particular case one may observe
them separately. Conditional probabilities of all possible out-
comes are denoted in Table 1.
The altered Alice-Eve-Bob channel can be considered as com-
bination of the binary symmetric erasure channel (BSE) at the
Alice-Eve part and the BSEE at the Eve-Bob part with additional
decoy state input. The first part is characterized with proba-
bilities PS and PD related to USD for signal and decoy states
respectively. The second part is the same as the original channel
except for the modified parameters (denoted with the lower
indices e) and the input of inconclusive results from the Alice-
Eve part. If Eve performs USD only on the part of qubits then
combination of the Alice-Bob (with probability 1− Pe) and Alice-
Eve-Bob (with probability Pe) channels’ parameters are denoted
by tildas. Calculated relations between input and output param-
eters (i.e. conditional probabilities) for this channel can be found
in Table 2.
We would like to consider the case where Eve tries to keep
the detection rates and the error rates the same as in the original
channel (like without USD attack) as follows
D˜ = D+ Pe (PDDe − D) = D, (1)
G˜ = G+ Pe (PS(1− Ge)− (1− G)) = G, (2)
E˜ = E+ Pe (PSEe − E) = E. (3)
Let us consider further only decoy states since it is free parameter
that will not affect the raw key generation rates (1− G). As one
may notice the only way for legitimate users to prevent USD
attack is to choose decoy state that even if De approaches to
unity the inequality condition as follows is satisfied
PD < D. (4)
Table 1. Conditional probabilities between input (vertical)
and output (horizontal) parameters in the Alice-Bob chan-
nel1.
Input/Output 0 1 Inconclusive result
0 C E G
1 E C G
D D(0) D(1) 1− D(0) − D(1)
1G, E and C = 1− G − E are probabilities of the inconclusive
result, the bitflip, and the conclusive result for signal states
respectively, D(0) and D(1) are probabilities to interpret decoy
state as logical 0 and 1 respectively.
This relation helps us estimate maximal allowed losses in the
channel since D is dependent on them. It should be noticed that
Eve’s method of discriminating signal states is always better
then Bob’s one due to her ideal equipment. Nevertheless Eve
have to discriminate also the decoy states in our case, and for
Bob it is not necessary since Alice always tells him during the
reconciliation which exact pulse or time bin contains the decoy.
In this way, if the structure of decoy state will be correct we can
provide fundamental impossibility to discriminate such states
to Eve. So let us consider further USD measurement in more
details and find suitable parameters on decoy states that satisfies
Eq. 4.
3. UNAMBIGUOUS STATE DISCRIMINATION
Unambiguous state discrimination was proposed firstly in
[10, 11, 13] and developed in the next papers [9, 12]. The main
idea of this measurement is to unambiguously identify non-
orthogonal linearly independent quantum states. First method
of distinguishing three states was proposed in [14]. Let us con-
sider three quantum states |u1〉, |u2〉 and |u3〉. Two of them
(|u1〉 = |αeiφ〉 and |u2〉 = | − αeiφ〉) supposed to be the signal
states and can be taken as the weak coherent states with the am-
plitude α and the phase φ. The third one (|u3〉) is the decoy state
and should be chosen correctly. Signal states should be sent in
the channel with equal a priori probability 1−ν2 and decoy state
with a priori probability ν. Those states could be unambiguously
discriminated by Eve, if she correctly determines the positive-
operator valued measure (POVM) as
3
∑
i=0
Aˆi = Iˆ (where Iˆ is unity
matrix). Here the operator Aˆ0 is related to an inconclusive result,
which is always presented due to nonorthogonality of the states
|u1〉, |u2〉 and |u3〉. Operators Aˆi contain probabilities of success-
ful discrimination of signal and decoy states respectively which
are variable parameters. The detailed construction method of
operators Aˆi was described in [14]. Let us denote the elements
of overlapping matrix of our states
S12 = 〈u1|u2〉, S13 = 〈u1|u3〉, S23 = 〈u2|u3〉. (5)
The next step is to denote the orthonormal basis in three-
dimensional vector space |u1〉, |u2〉 and |u3〉 using the Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalization process. In this orthonormal basis
the vectors (|ui〉) and the normalized reciprocal 2 to them (|vi〉)
2By reciprocal we mean relations 〈vi |uj〉 = 0 if i 6= j and 〈vi |uj〉 = 1 if i = j.
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Table 2. Conditional probabilities between input (vertical) and output (horizontal) parameters in the Alice-Eve-Bob channel3.
Input/Output 0 1 Inconclusive result
0 (1− Pe)C+ PePSCe (1− Pe)E+ PePSEe (1− Pe)G+ Pe
(
PSGe + (1− PS)
)
1 (1− Pe)E+ PePSEe (1− Pe)C+ PePSCe (1− Pe)G+ Pe
(
PSGe + (1− PS)
)
D (1− Pe)D(0) + PePDD(0)e (1− Pe)D(1) + PePDD(1)e (1− Pe)
(
1− D
)
+ Pe
(
PD(1− De) + (1− PD)
)
3 PS and PD are probabilities to unambiguously discriminate signal and decoy states respectively, Ge, Ee, and Ce = 1− Ge − Ee are
altered probabilities of the inconclusive result, the bitflip, and the conclusive for signal states respectively, D(0)e and D
(1)
e are altered
probabilities to interpret decoy state as logical 0 and 1 respectively, De = D
(0)
e + D
(1)
e .
(also known as binormalized) are denoted as
|u1〉 =

1
0
0
 , |u2〉 =

S12
L
0
 , |u3〉 =

S13
K
L
M
L
 , (6)
|v1〉 =

1
−S∗12
L
H∗
LM
 , |v2〉 =

0
1
L
−K∗
LM
 , |v3〉 =

0
0
L
M
 , (7)
where H = S12 · S23 − S13, K = S23 − S∗12 · S13, L =
√
1− |S12|2,
M =
√
1− |S13|2 − |S12|2 − |S23|2 + S∗12S13S∗23 + S12S∗13S23.
Here one may notice that if |u3〉 can be expressed as normal-
ized linear combination of |u1〉 and |u2〉 then M = 0 and the
construction of |vi〉 vectors is impossible. Thus USD measure-
ment cannot be implemented by Eve and we can overcome the
USD attack.
4. SYMMETRICAL CASE
Let us consider symmetrical case which is naturally takes place
in QKD systems (however following can be extended to more
general case if necessary) where
S12 = 〈u1|u2〉 = exp(−2α2),
S13 = S23 = 〈u1|u3〉 = 〈u2|u3〉,
(8)
where α is amplitude of the coherent state. Operator Aˆ0 is de-
noted as
Aˆ0 = Iˆ −
(
PS · (|v1〉〈v1|+ |v2〉〈v2|) + PD · |v3〉〈v3|
)
, (9)
where PS is equal probability of successful discrimination for
both signal states and PD is probability of successful discrimi-
nation for decoy states. In the orthonormal basis the operator
matrix Aˆ0 = Iˆ −
3
∑
i=1
Aˆi should be represented as follows
Aˆ0 =

1− PS PS ·S12L −PS ·HL·M
PS ·S∗12
L 1− PS ·(1+|S12|
2)
L2
PS ·(S∗12·H+K)
M·L2
−PS ·H∗
L·M
PS ·(S12·H∗+K∗)
M·L2 1−
PS ·(|H|2+|K|2)+L4·PD
(M·L)2
 . (10)
The determinant of A0 is derived as
det(A0) =
1
M2
·
(
2 · PD · PS + P2S − PD · L2−
−PS · (2− |S13|2 − |S23|2)− PD · P2S + M2
)
.
(11)
Let us denote the mean probability of inconclusive result as
P0. This probability depends on variable parameters and equals
to
P0 = 1− (1− ν)PS − νPD. (12)
The main goal of USD consists in solving the optimization prob-
lem to minimize the probability P0. The minimum should be
investigated when operator A0 has zero eigenvalue. This con-
dition corresponds to det(A0) = 0 [14]. Then optimization
problem has the next form{
P0 = 1− (1− ν)PS − νPD
det(A0) = 0
. (13)
Let us express PD from the second condition, det(A0) = 0, as
follows
PD = f1(PS) =
PS − ∆
PS − 1− S12 , (14)
where ∆ = 1 + S12 − 2|S13|2. Also let us define PD from Eq. 12
as follows
PD = f2(PS) =
1− P0 − (1− ν)PS
ν
, (15)
when the value of P0 is fixed. Consider two curves f1 and f2 on
the surface (PD, PS). Varying P0 determines the intersection of
these two curves. Obtained values of PS and PD are the optimal
probability of the unambiguous discrimination of the signal and
the decoy states respectively for given P0 (nevertheless not all
values of P0 corresponds to intersection).
In fact PS and PD can be equal to zero if we chose |u3〉 in
some special way. In this case decoy state should be described
as the Schrödinger Cat state [15–18] and looks like the linear
combination of two weak coherent states
|u3〉 = |αe
iφ〉+ | − αeiφ〉√
2 (1 + exp(−2α2) . (16)
Utilizing Schrödinger Cat states (even coherent states) one can
make USD attack useless at all.
5. SQUEEZED VACUUM REALIZATION
Proposed decoy method may be implemented utilizing paramet-
ric generation; one may chose |u3〉 as the single mode squeezed
vacuum state [19] as follows
|u3〉 = |0, r〉 = 1√
cosh(r)
∞
∑
n=0
√
(2n)!
2nn!
(tanh(r))n |2n〉, (17)
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where r is the squeezing parameter. Further we consider real
r and ϕ = 0. Thus according to Eq. 14 following expression
should be minimized varying the squeezing parameter r in order
to minimize PS and PD
∆ = 1 + exp(−2α2)− 2
cosh(r)
exp
(
− α2(1− tanh(r))). (18)
Minimum value of ∆ is obtained when α and r are related as
α =
√
exp(−r) · cosh(r) · ln
(
exp(r) · (cosh(r))2
)
. (19)
Nevertheless squeezed vacuum decoy state might not dis-
ables USD completely yet produces discrimination probabilities
low enough to distribute keys in channel with particular losses.
In this case one should pay attention to the threshold on the
number of detected decoy states ND. If following inequality
satisfies that there might be USD attack with the probability
erf( z√
2
), where the latter is error function
ND ≤ ND˜+ z
√
ND˜(1− D˜) < ND− z
√
ND(1− D), (20)
and where N is the number of sent decoy states. This threshold
provide useful rule of thumb estimating when QKD can be per-
formed in the channel with maximal allowed losses Lmax equals
approximately to difference between the maximal possible de-
tection probability of decoy states and the probability of their
discrimination in dB as follows:
Lmax ≈ −10 log10(µηBηD − PD), (21)
where µ is mean photon number for the decoy states, ηB is losses
on the Bob’s side, and ηD is quantum efficiency of the detector.
6. CONCLUSION
In this work we consider the approach for QKD protocols with
phase coded weak coherent states that disables USD attack utiliz-
ing Schrödinger Cat decoy states. We demonstrate the method
considering only two signal states and one decoy state which
is the simplest version of the protocol. However it is scalable
and one may follow the article in order to apply the method for
arbitrary amount of used states.
Symmetrical case following Eqs. 8 and 9 is naturally takes
place in QKD systems so it is essential to consider it. Eq. 14
allows us to chose decoy state |u3〉 in order to nullify or minimize
both PS and PD. The Schrödinger Cat states (even coherent
states) and squeezed vacuum states are responsible for the first
and the second cases respectively.
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